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I

n American academe today the dominant view of civil-military relations is
sternly critical of the military, asserting that civilian control of the military
is dangerously eroded.1 Though tension clearly exists in the relationship, the
current critique is largely inaccurate and badly overwrought. Far from overstepping its bounds, America’s military operates comfortably within constitutional
notions of separated powers, participating appropriately in defense and national
security policymaking with due deference to the principle of civilian control.
Indeed, an active and vigorous role by the military in the policy process is and
always has been essential to the common defense.
A natural starting point for any inquiry into the state of civil-military
relations in the US today is to define what is meant by the terms “civil-military
relations” and “civilian control.” Broadly defined, “civil-military relations”
refers to the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger
society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how the
interface between them is ordered and regulated. Similarly, “civilian control”
means simply the degree to which the military’s civilian masters can enforce
their authority on the military services.2
Clarifying the vocabulary of civil-military relations sheds an interesting light on the current, highly charged debate. The dominant academic
critique takes several forms, charging that the military has become increasingly
estranged from the society it serves;3 that it has abandoned political neutrality
for partisan politics;4 and that it plays an increasingly dominant and illegitimate
role in policymaking.5 This view contrasts the ideal of the nonpartisan, apolitical
soldier with a different reality. In this construct, the military operates freely in
a charged political environment to “impose its own perspective” in defiance of
the principle of civilian control.6 The critique is frequently alarmist, employing
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terms like “ominous,”7 “alienated,”8 and “out of control.”9 The debate is strikingly one-sided; few civilian or military leaders have publicly challenged the
fundamental assumptions of the critics.10 Yet as we shall see, the dominant
scholarly view is badly flawed in its particulars, expressing a distorted view of
the military at work in a complex political system that distributes power widely.

The Civil-Military Gap
The common assertion that a “gap” exists which divides the military
and society in an unhealthy way is a central theme. Unquestionably, the military as an institution embraces and imposes a set of values that more narrowly
restricts individual behavior. But the evidence is strong that the public understands the necessity for more circumscribed personal rights and liberties in the
military, and accepts the rationale for an organizationally conservative outlook
that emphasizes the group over the individual and organizational success over
personal validation.
The tension between the conservative requirements of military life and
the more liberal outlook of civil society goes far back before the Revolution to
the early days of colonial America’s militia experience. Though it has waxed
and waned, it has remained central to the national conversation about military
service.11 The issue is an important one: the military holds an absolute monopoly
on force in society, and how to keep it strong enough to defend the state and
subservient enough not to threaten it is the central question in civil-military
relations. Most commentators assume that this difference in outlook poses a
significant problem—that at best it is a condition to be managed, and at worst
a positive danger to the state. As a nation, however, America has historically
accepted the necessity for a military more highly ordered and disciplined than
civil society.
While important cultural differences exist between the services and
even between communities within the services,12 the military in general
remains focused on a functional imperative that prizes success in war above all
else. Though sometimes degraded during times of lessened threat, this imperative has remained constant at least since the end of the Civil War and the rise
of modern military professionalism. It implies a set of behaviors and values
markedly different from those predominant in civil society, particularly in an
all-volunteer force less influenced by large numbers of temporary conscripts.
Though the primary function of the military is often described as “the
application of organized violence,” the military’s conservative and groupcentered bias is based on something even more fundamental. In the combat
forces which dominate the services, in ethos if not in numbers, the first-order
challenge is not to achieve victory on the battlefield. Rather it is to make the
combat soldier face his own mortality. Under combat conditions the existence
of risk cannot be separated from the execution of task. The military culture,
while broadly conforming to constitutional notions of individual rights and
liberties, therefore derives from the functional imperative and by definition
values collective over individual good.
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The American public intuitively understands this, as evidenced by
polling data which demonstrate conclusively that a conservative military ethic
has not alienated the military from society.13 On the contrary, public confidence
in the military remains consistently high, more than a quarter century after
the end of the draft and the drawdown of the 1990s, both of which lessened
the incidence and frequency of civilian participation in military affairs. There
is even reason to believe that the principal factors cited most often to explain
the existence of the “gap”—namely the supposed isolation of the military from
civilian communities and the gulf between civilian and military values—have
been greatly exaggerated.
The military “presence” in civil society is not confined to serving
members of the active-duty military. Rather, it encompasses all who serve or
have served, active and reserve. For example, millions of veterans with firsthand knowledge of the military and its value system exist within the population
at large. The high incidence of married service members and an increasing
trend toward off-base housing mean that hundreds of thousands of military
people and their dependents live in the civilian community. Reserve component installations and facilities and the reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines who serve there bring the military face to face with society every day
in thousands of local communities across the country. Commissioned officers,
and increasingly noncommissioned officers (NCOs), regularly participate in
civilian educational programs, and officer training programs staffed by active,
reserve, and retired military personnel are found on thousands of college and
high school campuses. Military recruiting offices are located in every sizable
city and town. Many military members even hold second jobs in the private
sector. At least among middle-class and working-class Americans, the military
is widely represented and a part of everyday life.14
Just as the military’s isolation from society is often overstated, differences in social attitudes, while clearly present, do not place the military outside
the mainstream of American life. The dangers posed by a “values gap” are
highly questionable given the wide disparity in political perspectives found
between the east and west coasts and the American “heartland”; between
urban, suburban, and rural populations; between north and south; between
different religious and ethnic communities; and between social and economic
classes. It may well be true that civil society is more forgiving than the military
for personal failings like personal dishonesty, adultery, indebtedness, assault,
or substance abuse. But society as a whole does not condone these behaviors
or adopt a neutral view. To the extent that there are differences, they are differences of degree. On fundamental questions about the rule of law, on the
equality of persons, on individual rights and liberties, and on civilian control of
the military in our constitutional system, there are no sharp disagreements with
the larger society. Indeed, there is general agreement about what constitutes
right and wrong behavior.15 The difference lies chiefly in how these ideals of
“right behavior” are enforced. Driven by the functional imperative of battlefield
success, the military as an institution views violations of publicly accepted
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standards of behavior more seriously because they threaten the unity, cohesion,
or survival of the group.16 Seen in this light, the values “gap” assumes a very
different character.
To be sure, sweeping events have altered the civil-military compact.
The advent of the all-volunteer force, the defeat in Vietnam, the end of the Cold
War, the drawdown of the 1990s, the impact of gender and sexual orientation
policies, and a host of other factors have influenced civil-military relations in
important ways. The polity no longer sees military service as a requirement of
citizenship during periods of national crisis, or a large standing military as a
wartime anomaly. Despite such fundamental changes, over time public support
for the military and its values has remained surprisingly enduring, even as the
level of public participation in military affairs has declined.

The “Politicization” of the Military
Of equal or perhaps greater import is the charge that the military has
abandoned its tradition of nonpartisan service to the state in favor of partisan
politics. Based on apparently credible evidence that the military has embraced
conservatism as a political philosophy and affiliated with the Republican Party,
this view implies a renunciation of the classical, archetypal soldier who neither
voted nor cared about partisan politics. Nevertheless, as with the “values gap,”
the charge that the US military has become dangerously politicized does not
stand up to closer scrutiny. The tradition of nonpartisanship is alive and well
in America’s military.
One can plausibly speculate on trends which suggest greater Republican
affiliation over the past generation or so. Seven of the last ten presidential
administrations have been Republican. For those with a propensity to enter the
military and even more for those who choose to stay, the Republican Party is
generally seen as more supportive of military pay, quality of life, and a strong
defense. Since the late 1970s, the percentage of young Americans identifying
themselves as Republicans rose significantly across the board.
Still, from 1976 to 1999, the number of high school seniors expecting to enter the military and self-identifying as Republicans never exceeded
40 percent and actually declined significantly from 1991 to 1999. Despite the
end of the draft and the more market-inspired and occupational flavor of military service under the all-volunteer concept, new recruits “are predominantly
not Republican and are less Republican than their peers who go to college.”17
Increasingly it seems clear that the young enlisted service members who make
up a large proportion of the force cannot be characterized as predominantly
conservative or Republican.
The figures for senior military officers are quite different; about two
thirds self-identify as Republican. To some extent this reflects the attitudes
of the socio-economic cohort they are drawn from, generally defined as nonminority, college educated, belonging to mainstream Christian denominations,
and above average in income. On the other hand, military elites overwhelmingly shun the “far-right” or “extremely conservative” labels, are far less
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supportive of fundamentalist religious views, and are significantly more liberal
than mainstream society as a whole on social issues.18 It is far more accurate to
say that senior military leaders occupy the political center than to portray them
as creatures of the right.
If the conservative orientation of the military is less clear-cut than
commonly supposed, its actual impact on American electoral politics is highly
doubtful. As we have seen, the attitudes and orientation of the enlisted force
vary considerably. The commissioned officer corps, comprising perhaps ten
percent of the force (roughly 120,000 active-duty members) and only a tiny
fraction of the electorate, is not in any sense politically active. It does not
proselytize among its subordinates, organize politically, contribute financially
to campaigns to any significant degree or, apparently, vote in large numbers.
There is no real evidence that the military has become increasingly partisan in
an electoral sense, or that it plays an important role in election outcomes. As
Lance Betros has argued,
The fundamental weakness of this argument is that it ascribes to military voters a level of partisanship that is uncharacteristic of the voting
public. The vast majority of people who cast votes for Democrats or
Republicans are not partisans, in the sense of actively advancing the
party’s interests. Instead, they comprise the “party in the electorate,”
a much looser affiliation than the party organization. . . . [T]hese
voters do not have more than a casual involvement in the party’s
organizational affairs and rarely interact with political leaders and
activists. They are, in effect, the consumers, not the purveyors, of the
party’s partisan appeals and policies.19

A common criticism is that a growing tendency by retired military
elites to publicly campaign for specific candidates signals an alarming move
away from the tradition of nonpartisanship. But aside from the fact that this
trend can be observed in favor of both parties,20 not just the Republicans, evidence that documents the practical effect of these endorsements is lacking.
Except in wartime, most voters cannot even identify the nation’s past or present
military leaders. They are unlikely to be swayed by their endorsements. Nor
is there any evidence that the political actions of retired generals and admirals
unduly influence the electoral or policy preferences of the active-duty military.
We are in fact a far cry from the days when senior military leaders actually
contended for the presidency while on active duty—a far more serious breach
of civilian control.

The Military Role in the Policy Process
More current is the suggestion that party affiliation lends itself to military resistance to civilian control in policy matters, especially during periods of
Democratic control. The strongest criticism in this vein is directed at General
Colin Powell as a personality and gays in the military as a policy issue, with
any number of prominent scholars drawing overarching inferences about
civil-military relations from this specific event.21 This tendency to draw broad
conclusions from a specific case is prevalent in the field but highly questionable
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as a matter of scholarship. The record of military deference to civilian control,
particularly in the recent past, in fact supports a quite different conclusion.
Time and again in the past decade, military policy preferences on troop
deployments, the proliferation of nontraditional missions, the draw-down,
gender issues, budgeting for modernization, base closure and realignment, and
a host of other important issues were overruled or watered down. Some critics,
most notably Andrew Bacevich, argue that President Clinton did not control
the military so much as he placated it: “The dirty little secret of American
civil-military relations, by no means unique to this [Clinton] administration, is
that the commander-in-chief does not command the military establishment; he
cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases it.”22 This conclusion
badly overreaches. Under President Clinton, military force structure was cut
well below the levels recommended in General Powell’s Base Force recommendations. US troops remained in Bosnia far beyond the limits initially set by
the President. Funding for modernization was consistently deferred to pay for
contingency operations, many of which were opposed by the Joint Chiefs. In
these and many other instances, the civilian leadership enforced its decisions
firmly on its military subordinates. On virtually every issue, the military chiefs
made their case with conviction, but acquiesced loyally and worked hard to
implement the decisions of the political leadership.
As many scholars point out, the election of Bill Clinton in 1992 posed
perhaps the most severe test of civil-military relations since the JohnsonMcNamara era. Avowedly anti-military in his youth, Clinton came to office
with a background and political makeup that invited confrontation with the
military. His determination to open the military to gays, announced during the
campaign and reiterated during the transition, provoked widespread concerns
among senior military leaders. Eminent historians Russell Weigley and Richard
Kohn have severely criticized the military’s role in this controversy, and in
particular General Powell’s actions. Weigley cites the episode as “a serious
breach of the constitutional principle of civilian control” justifying a “grave
accusation of improper conduct.” Kohn characterizes it hyperbolically as “the
most open manifestation of defiance and resistance by the American military
since the publication of the Newburgh address. . . . [N]othing like this had ever
occurred in American history.”23
All this is poor history and even poorer political science. The presidential candidacies of Taylor, Scott, McClellan, Grant, Hancock, Wood, and
MacArthur while on active duty suggest far more serious challenges to civilian
control. The B36 controversy (the “Revolt of the Admirals”) in 1948 and the
overt insubordination leading to the relief of MacArthur in 1952 represented
direct challenges to the political survival of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson
in the first case and President Truman himself in the second. The “gays in the
military” dispute was very different and much less significant in overarching
national security import. A more balanced critique suggests that the controversy hardly warrants the claims made on its behalf.
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The Apolitical Soldier Revisited
The characterization of General Powell as a “politician in uniform” is
often contrasted with the ideal of the nonpartisan soldier modeled by Huntington.
This rigidly apolitical model, typified by figures like Grant, Sherman, Pershing,
and Marshall, colors much of the current debate. The history of civil-military
relations in America, however, paints a different picture. Since the Revolution,
military figures have played prominent political roles right up to the present
day. The ban on partisanship in electoral politics, while real, is a relatively
modern phenomenon. But the absence of the military from the politics of policy
is, and always has been, largely a myth.
The roster of former general officers who later became President shows
a strong intersection between politics and military affairs. The list includes
Washington (probably as professional a soldier as it was possible to be in colonial
America), Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, Grant, Hays, Garfield, and Eisenhower.
(Many others had varying degrees of military service, some highly significant.)24 The list of prominent but unsuccessful presidential aspirants who were
also military leaders includes Scott, Fremont, McClellan, Hancock, Leonard
Wood, Dewey, and MacArthur. Even in the modern era, many senior military
leaders have served in high political office, while many others tried unsuccessfully to enter the political arena.25 Even some of the paladins of the apolitical
ideal, such as Grant, Sherman, and Pershing, benefited greatly from political
patronage at the highest levels.26
In attempting to reconcile an obvious pattern of military involvement
in American political life to the apolitical ideal, historians have sometimes
differentiated between “professional” and “nonprofessional” soldiers. The nonprofessionals, so the argument runs, can be excused for their political activity on
the grounds that they were at best part-timers whose partisan political behavior
did not threaten the professional ethic. Yet many commanded large bodies of
troops and simultaneously embodied real political strength and power.27 Indeed,
for much of American history, the military was not recognizably professional at
all. Before the Civil War, American military professionalism as we understand
it today did not exist.28 The regular officer corps was so small, so poorly educated, and so rife with partisan politics that in time of war it was often led, not
by long-service professionals, but essentially by political figures like Andrew
Jackson. Even those few career soldiers who rose to the top in wartime, such
as Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, not infrequently became politicians who
contended for the presidency itself—Taylor successfully, and Scott notably not.
America fought the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War
using the traditional model of a small professional army and a large volunteer
force, mostly led by militia officers or social and political elites with little or
no military training—including many politicians (War Department policy kept
Regular officers in junior grades with Regular units; few escaped to rise to high
command).29 By war’s end, politicians in uniform like Butler, McClernand,
and Sickles and politically ambitious generals like McClellan and Fremont
had given way to more professionally oriented commanders. In the postwar
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period the notion of the talented amateur on the battlefield faded while the
memory of the “political” generals, often acting in league with the congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War to further their own personal
interests, continued to rankle. Until the turn of the century the Army would be
run by professional veterans of the Civil War, particularly General Sheridan
as Commanding General, and they would attempt to impose a stern ethic of
political neutrality.30
That this ethic heavily influenced the professional officer corps cannot
be doubted—and yet the tradition of career military figures seeking political
office continued.31 Nor did the ethic renounce active participation in the politics
of military policy. Even at a time when the military-industrial complex was far
less important than today, when the military share of the budget was tiny and
the political spoils emanating from the military inconsequential, the military
services struggled mightily with and against both the executive and legislative branches in pursuit of their policy goals. In cases too numerous to count,
the military services used the linkages of congressional oversight to advance
their interests and preserve their equities against perceived executive encroachment. Over time, a strong prohibition on military involvement in electoral
politics evolved which remains powerfully in effect today. But the realities of
separated powers, as well as the powerful linkages between defense industries,
congressional members and staff, and the military services do not—and never
have—allowed the military to stand aloof from the bureaucratic and organizational pulling and hauling involved in the politics of policy.

The Separatist vs. Fusionist Debate
There are essentially two competing views on the subject of the military’s proper role in the politics of policy. The first holds that the military officer
is not equipped by background, training, or inclination to fully participate in
defense policymaking. In this view, mastering the profession of arms is so
demanding and time-consuming, and the military education system so limiting, that an understanding of the policy process is beyond the abilities of the
military professional.32
Military officers are ill prepared to contribute to high policy. Normal
career patterns do not look towards such a role; rather they are—and
should be—designed to prepare officers for the competent command
of forces in combat or at least for the performance of the highly
complex subsidiary tasks such command requires. . . . [M]ilitary
officers should not delude themselves about their capacity to master
dissimilar and independently difficult disciplines.33
Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism,
curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession
against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional
values.34
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Aside from the question of competence, this “separatist” critique warns
of the tendency toward the militarization of foreign and defense policy should
military officers be allowed to fully participate. Critics assert that given the
predisposition toward bellicosity and authoritarianism cited by Huntington
and others, too much influence by the military might tend to skew the policy
process to favor use of force when other, less direct approaches are called for.35
An alternative view, the “fusionist” or “soldier-statesman” view, holds
that direct participation by military leaders in defense policy is both necessary
and inevitable.
President Kennedy specifically urged—even ordered—the military,
from the Joint Chiefs right down to academy cadets, to eschew
“narrow” definitions of military competence and responsibilities,
take into account political considerations in their military recommendations, and prepare themselves to take active roles in the
policy-making process.36

If the assumption of unique expertise is accurate, only the military
professional can provide the technical knowledge, informed by insight and
experience, needed to support high-quality national security decisionmaking. Given the certainty that military input is both needed and demanded by
Congress as well as the executive branch, military advocacy cannot be avoided
in recommending and supporting some policy choices over others. This school
holds that long service in this environment, supplemented by professional
schooling in the tools and processes of national security, equips senior military
leaders to fulfill what is, after all, an inescapable function.
These two competing perspectives mirror the “realist” and “idealist”
theories of politics and reflect the age-old division in political science between
those who see reality “as it is” and those who see it “as it ought to be.” As
we have seen, the historical record is unequivocal. Military participation in
partisan politics has been inversely proportional to the growth of military professionalism, declining as the professional ethic has matured. But the role of the
military in defense policymaking has endured from the beginning, increasing
as the resources, complexity, and gravity which attend the field of national
security have grown. The soldier statesman has not just come into his own. He
has always been.

The Nature of Military Involvement in Defense Policymaking
If this is true, to what extent is such participation dangerous? Does
active military involvement in defense policymaking actually threaten civilian
control?
Clearly there have been individual instances where military leaders
crossed the line and behaved both unprofessionally and illegitimately with
respect to proper subordination to civilian authority; the Revolt of the Admirals
and the MacArthur-Truman controversy already have been cited. The increasingly common tactic whereby anonymous senior military officials criticize their
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civilian counterparts and superiors, even to the point of revealing privileged
and even classified information, cannot be justified.
Yet civilian control remains very much alive and well. The many
direct and indirect instruments of objective and subjective civilian control of
the military suggest that the true issue is not control—defined as the government’s ability to enforce its authority over the military—but rather political
freedom of action. In virtually every sphere, civilian control over the military
apparatus is decisive. All senior military officers serve at the pleasure of the
President and can be removed, and indeed retired, without cause. Congress
must approve all officer promotions and guards this prerogative jealously; even
lateral appointments at the three- and four-star levels must be approved by the
President and confirmed by Congress, and no officer at that level may retire in
grade without separate approval by both branches of government. Operating
budgets, the structure of military organizations, benefits, pay and allowances,
and even the minutia of official travel and office furniture are determined by
civilians. The reality of civilian control is confirmed not only by the many
instances cited earlier where military recommendations were over-ruled. Not
infrequently, military chiefs have been removed or replaced by the direct and
indirect exercise of civilian authority.37
To be sure, the military as an institution enjoys some advantages. Large
and well-trained staffs, extended tenure, bureaucratic expertise, cross-cutting
relationships with industry, overt and covert relationships with congressional
supporters, and stability during lengthy transitions between administrations
give it a strong voice. But on the big issues of budget and force structure, social
policy, and war and peace, the influence of senior military elites—absent powerful congressional and media support—is more limited than is often recognized.
If this thesis is correct, the instrumentalities and the efficacy of civilian
control are not really at issue. As I have suggested, political freedom of action
is the nub of the problem. Hampered by constitutionally separated powers
which put the military in both the executive and legislative spheres, civilian
elites face a dilemma. They can force the military to do their bidding, but they
cannot always do so without paying a political price. Because society values
the importance of independent, nonpoliticized military counsel, a civilian who
publicly discounts that advice in an area presumed to require military expertise
runs significant political risks. The opposition party will surely exploit any
daylight between civilian and military leaders, particularly in wartime—hence
the discernible trend in the modern era away from the Curtis LeMays and
Arleigh Burkes of yesteryear who brought powerful heroic personas and public
reputations into the civil-military relationship.
It is therefore clear that much of the criticism directed at “political”
soldiers is not completely genuine or authentic. Far from wanting politically
passive soldiers, political leaders in both the legislative and executive branches
consistently seek military affirmation and support for their programs and policies. The proof that truly apolitical soldiers are not really wanted is found in the
pressures forced upon military elites to publicly support the policy choices of
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their civilian masters. A strict adherence to the apolitical model would require
civilian superiors to solicit professional military advice when needed, but not to
involve the military either in the decision process or in the “marketing” process
needed to bring the policy to fruition.
The practice, however, is altogether different. The military position of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service chiefs, and the combatant
commanders is always helpful in determining policy outcomes. The pressures
visited upon military elites to support, or at least not publicly refute, the policy
preferences of their civilian masters, especially in the executive branch, can be
severe. Annually as part of the budget process, the service chiefs are called upon
to testify to Congress and give their professional opinions about policy decisions affecting their service. Often they are encouraged to publicly differ with
civilian policy and program decisions they are known to privately question.38
This quandary, partly a function of the constitutional separation of
powers and partly due to party politics, drives the JCS Chairman and the
chiefs to middle ground. Not wanting to publicly expose differences with the
Administration, yet bound by their confirmation commitments to render unvarnished professional military opinions to Congress, military elites routinely
find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. These experiences, the bread and
butter of military service at the highest levels, frequently produce exasperation
and frustration. The consensus among civilian critics may be that the military
dominates the policy process. But the view from the top of the military hierarchy is something quite different.

Conclusion
For military officers working at the politico-military interface, the
problem of civil-military relations exists in its most acute form. There is,
after all, no real issue between the polity as a whole and the military as an
institution. Across the country the armed forces are seen as organizations that
work, providing genuine opportunities for minorities, consistent success on the
battlefield and in civil support operations here at home, and power and prestige
in support of American interests abroad. For most Americans the military’s
direct role in the interagency process and in the making of national security
policy is not only permissible, it is essential to informed governance and a
strong national defense.
The arguments advanced herein attempt to show that the dynamic
tension which exists in civil-military relations today, while in many cases suboptimal and unpleasant, is far from dangerous. Deeply rooted in a uniquely
American system of separated powers, regulated by strong traditions of subordination to civilian authority, and enforced by a range of direct and indirect
enforcement mechanisms, modern US civil-military relations remain sound,
enduring, and stable. The American people need fear no challenge to constitutional norms and institutions from a military which—however aggressive on
the battlefield—remains faithful to its oath of service. Not least of the Framer’s
achievements is the willing subordination of the soldiers of the state.
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